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Article: 
Luck varies from person to person, for two reasons. First, for something to occur as a matter of luck is for it to 
occur beyond the control of someone, and what is beyond one person's control may not be beyond another's. 
Second, luck may be either good or bad (or neutral — but in that case it is not very interesting), and what is 
good luck for one person may be bad luck for another. 
 
Moral philosophers have paid a good deal of attention to luck in an effort to determine its relevance to moral 
judgments of various sorts. We may distinguish three broad classes of such judgments: aretaic judgments, 
having to do with moral virtue and vice; deontic judgments, having to do with moral obligation; and what I will 
call hypological judgments,
1
 having to do with moral responsibility. In the wake of Harry Frankfurt's ground-
breaking discussion of the claim that moral responsibility requires control,
2
 most of the attention that has been 
devoted in recent years to moral luck has concerned hypological judgments in particular; deontic judgments and 
aretaic judgments have been given relatively short shrift. In this paper I will attempt a partial rectification of this 
bias; although I will not concern myself further with aretaic judgments, I will have a good deal to say about the 
relation between moral obligation and luck. 
 
The plan of the paper is this. Section I: I seek to clarify the distinction between hypological and deontic 
judgments. The failure fully to appreciate this distinction explains in part, I think, the tendency in recent 
discussions of moral luck not to attend explicitly to the relevance of luck to deontic judgments. Section II: I 
draw five distinctions concerning how something may be within or beyond someone's control, three of which I 
select for further examination. Section III: I consider the question whether moral obligation and moral 
responsibility differ with respect to how they relate to luck in terms of the first of these three distinctions: my 
tentative answer is 'No.' Section IV: I consider the question whether moral obligation and moral responsibility 
differ with respect to how they relate to luck in terms of the second of these three distinctions: my answer is 
'Yes.' Section V: I consider the question whether moral obligation and moral responsibility differ with respect to 
how they relate to luck in terms of the third of these three distinctions: my answer is again 'Yes.' Section VI: I 
consider the relevance of luck to moral dilemmas. Section VII: I return to the second of the three distinctions 
and note why it is that, in light of the discussion in Section VI, the difference between moral obligation and 
moral responsibility with respect to how they relate to luck in terms of this distinction is very deep — deeper 
than acknowledged in Section IV. Section VIII: I provide a summary of my findings. 
 
As the foregoing plan indicates, what follows will be more in the nature of a survey than of a detailed 
exploration. This is because there is a lot of ground to cover, much of it hitherto wholly uncharted. The map that 
will emerge is therefore not only partial (since it entirely overlooks aretaic judgments) but large-scale. This may 
be disappointing, in that many important questions will not receive the close attention that they deserve. 
Nonetheless, I take my project in this paper to be a necessary preliminary to bringing these questions into 
sharper focus. My hope is that my findings will prompt and guide further investigation into the relevance of 
luck to moral judgments of all sorts. 
 
 
I 
It seems often to have been assumed that what is to be said about the relevance of luck to hypological 
judgments can be carried over wholesale to what is to be said about the relevance of luck to deontic judgments. 
This may be due to a second assumption, according to which one is morally responsible for having done 
something if and only if one had a moral obligation not to do that thing but did it nonetheless. This claim may 
seem especially tempting if one puts it entirely in the terminology of responsibility: one is (retrospectively) 
responsible for having done something if and only if one was (prospectively) responsible for not doing it but did 
it nonetheless. Such a dual use of 'responsible' is liable to mislead. Henceforth, I will use the term only to refer 
to what is often called retrospective responsibility. I will not talk again of prospective responsibility; instead, I 
will talk of obligation. The second assumption should be rejected, though, even when it is restricted to overall 
moral obligation (which is my topic in this paper) and thus excludes merely prima facie obligation. 
 
One problem with the second assumption is that it confuses responsibility in general with culpability in 
particular; it overlooks laudability, the 'positive' aspect of responsibility. Whereas it may seem plausible to say 
that one is culpable for having done something if and only if one had an obligation not to do it that one did not 
fulfil, it is surely not at all tempting to tie laudability in this way to unfulfilled obligations.
3
 
 
Another problem is that, even when it is restricted to culpability, the second assumption is false — in both 
directions, I believe. It is false to say that one is culpable for having done something if one had an obligation not 
to do it that one did not fulfil, because it is possible to have an excuse for wrongdoing. This is commonly, 
though not universally, acknowledged. And it is, I think, false to say that one is culpable for having done 
something only if one had an obligation not to do it that one did not fulfil, because it is possible to have what I 
have elsewhere called an 'accuse' despite having done no wrong. This is not commonly acknowledged, although 
a few philosophers have recognized the possibility.
4
 
 
The reason why excuses and accuses are possible is that whether one is responsible for having done something 
is a function (in part) of what one believed one's obligations to be rather than of what one's obligations in fact 
were. One has an excuse, despite having done wrong, if one did not believe that one was doing wrong (and one 
is not culpable for this failure of belief). One has an accuse, despite having done no wrong, if one believed that 
one was nonetheless doing wrong (and one satisfies certain other necessary conditions of responsibility). 
Responsibility and obligation are in this way wholly independent of one another, not conceptually (since 
responsibility is in part a function of belief about obligation) but logically (since one can be responsible in the 
absence of having been obligated, and vice versa). 
 
There is thus a fundamental disparity between hypological and deontic judgments.
5
 This disparity is sometimes 
said to reside in the fact that judgments about obligation consist in evaluations of acts whereas judgments about 
responsibility consist in evaluations of agents. This claim is rather misleading, however, for at least two reasons. 
First, both kinds of judgment — deontic and hypological — concern both agents and acts; after all, it is agents 
that are obligated to act in certain ways, and it is for their acts that agents may be held responsible. Second, both 
kinds of judgment concern not just acting in particular but behavior in general (including omission) and the 
consequences of behavior. Despite these shortcomings, the claim is nonetheless helpful, I think, for it directs 
our attention to an important truth, namely, that deontic judgments constitute what may be called act-based (or, 
perhaps, act -focused) evaluations, whereas hypological judgments constitute agent-based evaluations. By this I 
mean that the primary concern of deontic judgments is the assessment of agents' behavior (and the 
consequences of this behavior
6
), relative to behavior in which they could otherwise engage or have engaged. 
The primary concern of hypological judgments is, by contrast, the assessment of agents in light of the behavior 
in which they have engaged. 
 
I have claimed that both excuses and accuses are possible and hence that hypological and deontic judgments are 
logically independent of one another. If I am right, there is surely good reason to suspect that what is to be said 
about the relevance of luck to hypological judgments cannot after all be carried over wholesale to the question 
of the relevance of luck to deontic judgments. I believe that this suspicion is correct, for reasons that I hope to 
make clear later. But I have not argued for the claim that both excuses and accuses are possible,
7
 and you may 
reject it, insisting that the second assumption, when restricted to culpability, is true — that is, that one is 
culpable for having done something if and only if one had an obligation not to do it that one did not fulfil. But 
even if you do wish to insist on this, you should recognize that hypological and deontic judgments are 
nonetheless distinct. As indicated earlier, obligation is essentially a prospective matter; if one is obligated at 
some time t to perform some act at some time t*, then t* cannot be earlier than t. In the interval (if any) between 
t and t*, the obligation is and must be unresolved, in that whether it will be fulfilled awaits determination. If one 
does fulfil it, one will have done right; if not, one will have done wrong. At the moment that this issue is 
resolved, the obligation ceases to be. There thus arise two distinct questions concerning the relation between 
luck and moral obligation: (A) whether and how the incurring of obligation is subject to luck; (B) whether and 
how the fulfilment of obligation is subject to luck. Responsibility, by contrast, is not a prospective matter. It is 
and can only be resolved, in that the 'mode' of one's responsibility — whether that of laudability or culpability 
(or, perhaps, neither
8
) — is always determinate. There thus arises just one pertinent question concerning the 
relation between luck and moral responsibility: (C) whether and how the incurring of responsibility is subject to 
luck. If you subscribe to the second assumption, you will match the incurring of culpability not with the 
incurring of obligation but with its resolution. That is, you will hold that one incurs culpability for doing 
something when and only when one fails to fulfil an obligation not to do it that one earlier incurred. You will 
thereby be treating responsibility as essentially retrospective. If, like me, you do not subscribe to the second 
assumption, perhaps you do not conceive of responsibility as essentially retrospective. (I will return to this issue 
in Section VII.) Nonetheless, you must, I think, acknowledge that all ascriptions of responsibility are 
determinate, in that they constitute ascriptions of either laudability or culpability (or, perhaps, neither). It makes 
no sense to ascribe unresolved responsibility to someone. 
 
In what follows, I will attend to each of questions A-C. 
 
II 
Many philosophers claim that moral responsibility is immune to luck inasmuch as one cannot be morally 
responsible for something that was not in one's control in some way and to some extent. I agree. (It is important 
to recognize that even Frankfurt agrees. His challenge concerns the traditional understanding of the way in 
which and the extent to which moral responsibility requires control; he does not deny that there is such a 
requirement.) We might try explaining this fact by appealing to the unfairness of holding someone morally 
responsible for something that was not in his (or her) control.
9
 Such an explanation might be used to argue for a 
disparity between responsibility and obligation as they relate to luck. It might be claimed that it is precisely in 
virtue of the fact that hypological judgments are agent-based that the possibility of unfairness in such judgments 
arises. Since deontic judgments are not agent-based, this possibility does not carry over to them. There would 
seem to be no unfairness in maintaining that someone had an obligation neither the incurring nor the fulfilment 
of which was in his control, as long as we do not hold him responsible either for its being incurred or for its 
eventual resolution. 
 
I do not endorse this line of thinking. I grant that it is unfair to hold someone responsible for something that was 
not in his control in any way or to any extent, but I think this is explained by, rather than an explanation of, the 
fact that responsibility requires control.
10
 I do not have a ready explanation for this fact in turn. I do not know 
what argument may be given for it (although I have elsewhere defended it against objections
11
); I will simply 
presuppose it here, with what I hope is some plausibility. And I think that, at least with respect to its resolution 
if not with respect to its being incurred, obligation is similar: no one can be obligated regarding something that 
is not in his control in any way or to any extent, for 'ought' (the 'ought' that expresses moral obligation) implies 
'can' (in a sense of 'can' that expresses some measure of personal freedom or control). Again, I do not know 
what argument may be given for this claim (although I have elsewhere defended it against objections
12
); I will 
simply presuppose it here, with what I again hope is some plausibility. 
 
Despite the fact that responsibility and obligation are alike in the way just indicated, disparities nonetheless 
exist between them with respect to luck, both because of the falsity (as I see it) of the second assumption noted 
in the last section and because of the distinction between the incurring and the resolution of obligation. (If the 
second assumption is true, then whatever measure of control is required in order for one to be culpable for 
something will be required in order for one to fail to fulfil an obligation, that is, in order for one to do wrong. If 
the assumption is false, then even if culpability and wrongdoing both require some measure of control, they 
may differ with respect to the details of their respective requirements. Furthermore, even if the assumption is 
true, whatever measure of control is required regarding the resolution of obligation may not be required 
regarding its being incurred.) In order to assess these disparities, we should distinguish certain ways in which 
something may be within or beyond someone's control. 
 
First, we should distinguish partial from complete control. One has complete control over something only if its 
occurrence is not contingent on anything that is beyond one's control. This is obviously unattainable by anyone 
at any time. I mention it only to dismiss it. Any control that we ever have over anything is at best partial. (If you 
doubt this, consider the simple fact that whatever control you enjoy over anything depends on your having been 
born — something that we may hope was in someone's control, but not yours.) I assume that this fact alone does 
not suffice to show that we are never responsible for or obligated regarding something. The control that is 
required for either incurring responsibility or fulfilling an obligation is therefore merely partial. 
 
Second, we should distinguish basic from comprehensive control.
13
 The idea is familiar, even if the terminology 
is not. It can best be conveyed by means of an example. Suppose that Bert holds up a bank. He does so by 
pointing a gun at Alf, a teller, and ordering him to hand over all the money in his till. Alf complies, and Bert 
walks off with the money. Alf's manager uncharitably complains to Alf, 'What business did you have giving all 
that money to that fellow? He doesn't even have an account with us!' To which Alf responds, 'He was pointing a 
gun at me! I had no choice!' We can all sympathize with Alf's response, but is it accurate? 
 
Strictly, it is not. Alf did indeed have a choice — and, we may assume, he made the right one. He thus had what 
I call basic control over his behavior. Nonetheless, insofar as he was strongly coerced to make the choice that he 
made, his behavior was not fully voluntary; it was not fully free, and so he did not have what I call fully 
comprehensive control over it. Such control can clearly come in degrees, depending on the force of the 
pressures that bear on the agent.
14
 It is often claimed that some measure of comprehensive control beyond 
merely basic control is required for responsibility. This may seem plausible. After all, who (other than his 
manager) would want to hold Alf responsible for handing over the money to Bert? But this betrays a confusion 
that I mentioned earlier. Perhaps it would indeed be a mistake to say that Alf is culpable for his behavior, but 
that is not to say that he is not responsible for it. He may in fact be laudable for it. 
 
Regardless of whether some measure of comprehensive control is required for responsibility, when it comes to 
comparing obligation with responsibility it is on merely basic control that I want to focus here. This is not 
because comprehensive control is not relevant to judgments about obligation. On the contrary, it surely can be. 
(In the absence of Bert's threat, Alf is presumably obligated not to hand over the money; in the presence of the 
threat, his not handing it over is rendered either supererogatory or wrong.) It is simply because luck is a 
function only of basic control. (The sort of control that Alf lacks regarding his handing over the money does not 
make his handing it over a matter of luck.) 
 
A third distinction is between deliberate and coincidental control. The term 'coincidental control' may seem an 
oxymoron, but the phenomenon to which I am applying it is genuine. Suppose that there is a safe whose 
contents you would dearly like to get your hands on. These contents are protected by a combination lock. To 
open the safe, all you have to do is turn the dial in accordance with the pertinent combination of numbers. But 
you do not know what the combination is. Can you open the safe? Well, yes and no. You can open it, since you 
can turn the dial in the requisite way; but you cannot open it intentionally. Thus you do not have deliberate 
control over opening it, although you do have coincidental control over doing so.
15
 In light of your lack of 
deliberate control over opening the safe, it would certainly be lucky for you (and unlucky for its owner) if you 
managed to open it nonetheless. The relevance of such luck to both moral obligation and moral responsibility is 
an issue that I will address in Section III. 
A fourth distinction is between direct and indirect control. One has indirect control over something just in case 
one has control over it by way of having control over something else. One has direct control over something just 
in case one has control over it that is not indirect. For example, a thoroughly drunk person may not have direct 
control over his present behavior; but if he had control over his drinking, then he had indirect control over his 
present behavior. The distinction between direct and indirect control is of great significance to ascriptions of 
moral responsibility, as I will explain in Sections IV and VII, where I will also address its relevance to moral 
obligation. 
 
A fifth distinction is between regulative and guidance control.
16
 One has regulative control over something just 
in case one can (in the relevant personal sense of 'can') bring it about and can also refrain from bringing it about. 
One has guidance control over something just in case one can bring it about, even if one cannot also refrain 
from bringing it about. This distinction has been brought to light in recent discussions of Frankfurt-type cases 
that seek to impugn the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (the principle that moral responsibility requires 
regulative control). The relevance of the distinction to both moral obligation and moral responsibility is an issue 
that I will address in Section V. 
 
The five distinctions just drawn are not the only ones that can be drawn. (For example, there is a distinction to 
be drawn between control that one can exercise as an individual and that which one can exercise as a member of 
some group. This, too, seems morally significant.) But I will leave all other distinctions aside. It is important to 
note that the distinctions cut across one another, in that partial control may be either basic or comprehensive, 
basic control may be either deliberate or coincidental, deliberate control may be either direct or indirect, and so 
on. In any particular case, then, whether someone has control over something is a matter of some complexity. 
 
III 
Let us now attend to the distinction between deliberate and coincidental control. 
 
Consider a commonplace objection to the sort of consequentialism espoused by G. E. Moore. (It is such a 
natural objection that many beginning students raise it. Apparently only seasoned philosophers manage to inure 
themselves to it.) According to this sort of consequentialism, it is one's moral obligation to perform that act (or 
one of those acts) among one's alternatives that would in fact have the best consequences overall. But, so the 
objection goes, whether one in fact manages to do this is completely fortuitous, since it is impossible to foretell 
in any detail what the consequences of one's alternatives would be, and this is inconsistent with its being the 
case that one ought, as a matter of moral obligation, to bring about the best consequences. 
 
Moore's response to this objection is well known. He says that it confounds moral obligation with moral 
responsibility.
17
 Consequential-ism does not imply that one is culpable if one fails to bring about the best 
consequences attainable; it only implies that one thereby does wrong. 
 
I of course approve of Moore's drawing this distinction, but I do not think that it is an adequate response to the 
objection. For reasons that I cannot go into here,
18
 I think we should say that whether one is morally obligated 
to do something depends in part on the foreseeable, rather than the actual, consequences of so acting. Moreover, 
for reasons that I will give in a moment, I think we should say that whether one is morally obligated to do 
something depends in part on what one can intentionally do. These two points place a strict limit on the extent 
to which luck can be a factor in our fulfilling our obligations, something that seems intuitively required if we 
are to think of them as moral obligations. 
 
Consider the safe. Suppose that there is good reason (morally speaking) for you to want to get your hands on its 
contents — it contains some medicine that is needed to save someone's life. Suppose that the best thing you 
could do under the circumstances would be to save this person's life. The consequentialist is then committed to 
saying that this is what you are morally obligated to do.
19
 But this seems absurd. The absurdity is reduced, but it 
is surely not eliminated, by the observation that you would not be to blame for not saving the person's life. How 
can you be morally obligated to do something of this sort, when your managing to do so would be a matter of 
sheer luck? (I recognize that rhetorical questions do not have the force of arguments. Nonetheless, this question 
seems to me to have considerable force.) The kind of luck at issue, of course, is that which has to do with 
something's being beyond one's deliberate control. It has been granted that you have coincidental control over 
opening the safe, and hence over saving the person's life. It is deliberate control over doing so that you lack. 
 
I am suggesting, then, that to be morally obligated to do something one must have deliberate control over doing 
it; if one cannot do it intentionally, then one cannot be morally obligated to do it in the first place. (This claim is 
actually too sweeping. I will qualify it in the next section.) If this is the case, then the fulfilment of obligation 
cannot in this way be subject to luck. It is important that this claim not be confused with two others. First, it 
does not follow that the incurring of obligation must be in one's deliberate control. Suppose that p implies q. 
Then arguably, for certain kinds of control, control over q implies control over p. Let p be the proposition that 
Joe is obligated to do some act A and q be the proposition that Joe can intentionally do A. Then, arguably, Joe's 
being in control of q implies his being in control of p. But why think that he is in control of q? His being in 
control of A does not imply his being in control of q. (Recall Jean-Paul Sartre's thesis that we are 'condemned' 
to be free.
20
) Thus I see no reason to think that Joe's being in control of A implies that he is in control of his 
being obligated to do A. 
 
Second, the claim (to be qualified in the next section) that one is morally obligated to perform an action only if 
one can intentionally perform that action (and thereby fulfil one's obligation) does not imply the claim that one 
is morally obligated to perform an action only if one can intentionally fulfil that obligation. Whether we should 
accept this further claim is unclear to me. I suspect that we should not. It implies that, to have a moral 
obligation, one must understand the concept of moral obligation. On pain of circularity, this cannot be an 
analytic truth. It might be a synthetic one, I suppose, but I know of no reason to think that it is. If it is not in fact 
true, then one can fail to have deliberate control over fulfilling one's obligation, even if one cannot fail to have 
deliberate control over doing that which in fact constitutes the fulfilment of one's obligation. In this way, moral 
obligation is not entirely immune to luck. 
 
Recall the second assumption noted in Section I (when restricted to culpability): one is culpable for having done 
something if and only if one had an obligation not to do it but did it nonetheless. If that assumption were true, 
then we should expect the points that I have just made about the relation between luck and the fulfilment of 
obligation to apply mutatis mutandis to the relation between luck and the incurring of responsibility. That is, we 
should expect, first, that one is culpable for performing an action only if one could perform it intentionally, but, 
second, that it is not the case that one is culpable for performing an action only if one could intentionally incur 
culpability for performing it. However, if the second assumption is false, as I believe, we cannot directly infer 
these claims about culpability from the earlier claims about obligation. Despite this fact, I think that the claims 
about culpability do hold nonetheless (although the first needs qualification, as does the counterpart claim about 
obligation). But I will not try to establish the symmetry between obligation and responsibility on this score. 
Instead, let me turn to a consideration of respects in which there is good reason to suspect an asymmetry 
between the fulfilment of obligation and the incurring of responsibility as they relate to luck. 
 
IV 
Consider the distinction between direct and indirect control. I said that this is of great significance to ascriptions 
of moral responsibility. This is because what is merely in our indirect control can at best be something for 
which we are merely indirectly responsible, and such responsibility can be said to be 'essentially empty.'21 (One 
is indirectly responsible for something just in case one is responsible for it by way of being responsible for 
something else.) Thomas Nagel asks, 'How is it possible to be more or less culpable depending on whether... a 
bird [gets] into the path of one's bullet?'
22
 The answer is that this is not possible. Consider two would-be 
assassins, one of whom is successful and the other of whom, due to the fortuitous intervention of a passing bird, 
is unsuccessful. We can depict their cases in somewhat simplified fashion as follows. Let a be the decision to 
shoot, b the retraction of the finger, c the movement of the trigger, d the firing of the gun, e the flight of the 
bullet, f the bullet's penetration of the victim's body, and g the victim's death. Then the case of the successful 
assassin looks like this: 
 
The arrows represent causation. A (which consists simply of a) is the minimal action (if it can be called an 
action at all) constituted by the assassin's decision. B (which consists of a's causing b) is the action of the 
assassin's moving his finger. (In von Wright's terminology, b is the 'result' of B.
23
) C (which consists of a's 
causing c) is the action of the assassin's pulling the trigger. D is the action of his firing the gun. E is the action 
of his causing the bullet to fly. F is the action of his shooting the victim. G is the action of his killing the victim. 
Note that, in light of the causal connections between a through g, the assassin may be said to do G by doing F, F 
by doing E, and so on. The case of the unsuccessful assassin is, by comparison, truncated. It looks like this: 
 
(Of course, there is more to this second case, since the bullet does not simply evaporate. But I am assuming that 
what is left out is morally irrelevant, in that nothing further occurs for which the agent may plausibly be said to 
be culpable.) 
 
Let us assume that the successful assassin is culpable for each of a through g (or A through G — it does not 
matter for present purposes whether we talk in terms of actions or their results). Clearly, the same is not true of 
the unsuccessful assassin, since he is culpable only for a through e. Thus it cannot be said that they are culpable 
for the same things. On the contrary, the successful assassin is culpable for more things than the unsuccessful 
assassin. Nonetheless, if two agents behave in the same way but their behavior, through luck, has different 
results, then there is nothing to distinguish between them, morally speaking. Thus the successful assassin is not 
more culpable than the unsuccessful assassin. This kind of comparison between cases reveals a key distinction 
between what may be called scope and degree of culpability.
24
 The assassins bear culpability to the same 
degree, although the successful assassin1s culpability has greater scope. 
 
As I have depicted their cases, the assassins have direct control over a but merely indirect control over the 
ensuing events. This is because whether the ensuing events occur is not in their control at all, except insofar as a 
itself is. As it is sometimes put, whether the ensuing events occur is not up to them but 'up to nature.’
25
 It should 
be clear that, just as nature can fail to cooperate by interrupting the sequence of events between e and f, as in the 
case of the unsuccessful assassin, so too it could interrupt this sequence at any point after the occurrence of a. (It 
could also intervene prior to a, but that raises issues that I will address in Section VII.) Interruption at any of 
these points would not serve to diminish the degree of the agent's culpability, although it would of course 
reduce its scope. How one is to be judged, from the moral point of view, is thus entirely a function of the 
degree, and not of the scope, of one's culpability.
26
 That over which one has merely indirect control is relevant 
only to the scope, and not the degree, of one's culpability. Thus it is irrelevant to how one is to be judged. 
 
The emptiness of indirect culpability — indeed, of indirect moral responsibility generally — should come as no 
surprise. It is an example of a phenomenon that is replicated elsewhere. Consider the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic value. One type of extrinsic value is instrumental value.
27
 Roughly, something has 
instrumental value insofar as it is conducive to something else that has intrinsic value. Suppose that pleasure is 
intrinsically good; then, insofar as my giving you a gift is conducive to your pleasure, it is instrumentally good. 
But instrumental goodness, like all extrinsic goodness, is empty; it does not add to the sum total of value in the 
world. If it did, then I could make things better by turning my gift-giving into a Rube Goldberg-type of affair 
(rather than simply presenting you with the gift, I do so by doing Z, which I do by doing Y, which I do by doing 
X, and so on back up the alphabet to A), and that is patently absurd. Extrinsic value, being merely indirect, is 
essentially empty. If I give you the gift in an elaborate way, I will have done more good things than if I give it 
to you in a simple way, but I will not have done more good.
28
 
 
Just as we can distinguish between direct and indirect responsibility and between direct and indirect value, we 
can also distinguish between direct and indirect obligation. (One is indirectly obligated regarding something just 
in case one is obligated regarding it by way of being obligated regarding something else.) And just as indirect 
responsibility and indirect value are essentially empty, so too is indirect obligation. Consider two doctors who 
are obligated to restore their patients' health by giving them an injection. In one case, the injection is 
administered simply; in the other, it is administered by means of some elaborate Rube Goldberg-type of 
mechanism. The first case can be depicted as follows (where a is the decision to inject, b the movement of the 
finger, c the depression of the syringe, d the medicine's entering the patient's body, and e the restoration of 
health): 
 
 
(I will forego depicting how actions A through E relate to events a through e.) The second case can be depicted 
as follows (where the xi are a long series of events that mediate between b and c): 
 
 
It is of course a substantive question what constitutes a direct obligation, but let us assume for the sake of 
illustration that the doctors' respective obligations to bring about e are direct.
29
 If we assume that each of the 
preceding events in the sequence is a necessary means to bringing about e, then it follows that the doctors have 
obligations to bring about each of these events, too .
30
 These obligations are, of course, indirect. In fact, let us 
assume that they are merely indirect, in that neither doctor would have an obligation to bring about any of a 
through d were it not for his obligation to bring about e. It is clear that, being merely indirect, these obligations 
carry no independent weight. The reason for this matches the reason given earlier. If this were not so, then the 
second doctor's failure to bring about any of a through e (including all of the xi) would constitute a more serious 
wrong than the first doctor's failure to do so; and this surely is not the case. The second doctor's more elaborate 
failure will involve more wrongs, but it will not involve more wrong. The scope of the second doctor's 
obligation is greater, but the degree to which he is obligated is the same. 
 
What is interesting, however, is that, despite the similarity between responsibility and obligation regarding the 
distinction between scope and degree, they nonetheless differ with respect to how this distinction relates to the 
distinction between direct and indirect control. As the cases of the assassins indicate, the direct-indirect 
responsibility distinction directly tracks the direct-indirect control distinction: what is merely in our indirect 
control is at best something for which we are merely indirectly responsible; we can be directly responsible only 
for that which is in our direct control. The same cannot be said regarding the distinction between direct and 
indirect obligation. On the contrary, as the cases of the doctors indicate, that regarding which they have a direct 
obligation (restoration of health) is something over which they have merely indirect control; that which is in 
their direct control (the decision to inject) is something regarding which they have a merely indirect obligation. 
What accounts for this discrepancy? 
 
The explanation is to be found, I think, in the fact that judgments about responsibility are agent-based whereas 
judgments about obligation are act-based. The degree to which a person is responsible has nothing to do with, 
and hence is not affected by, what is 'external' to him. The degree to which a person is obligated has much to do 
with what is 'external' to him. If the doctors fail to restore their patients' health, this wrongdoing has essentially 
to do with their patients, and the seriousness of this wrongdoing has essentially to do with how the patients are 
affected by it. The degree, if any, to which the doctors are culpable for failing to restore their patients' health has 
essentially to do, not with the patients, but with what the doctors believe concerning the seriousness of the 
wrongdoing involved in failing to restore their patients' health. This discrepancy between responsibility and 
obligation implies a disparity between them as they relate to luck. 
 
The disparity is this. As I said earlier, all control (all the control that anyone ever has) is partial control. But 
some instances of control are more partial (that is, less close to being complete) than others. Indirect control is 
always more partial than direct control, because it requires the cooperation of factors (which, by hypothesis, 
happens to be forthcoming) outside of one's control, factors whose cooperation is not required by direct control. 
If the doctors are obligated to restore their patients' health, then they can do so. (Indeed, they can intentionally 
do so. In my view, one can be directly obligated regarding (or directly responsible for) something only if one 
can (or could) intentionally do it. This provides the needed qualification to the too-sweeping claims made in the 
last section.) But that they can do so is due only to the cooperation of certain factors beyond their control 
(namely, all the events subsequent to a in the sequence of events from a through e). The fulfilment of an 
obligation is thus often a matter of luck in a way in which the incurring of responsibility is not. (Indeed, I would 
say that this is not just often but always the case. I cannot think of Plausible examples of direct obligations that 
are in one's direct control.
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V 
There are other differences regarding how luck pertains to the fulfilment of obligation as opposed to the 
incurring of responsibility, differences whose explanation is, I believe, to be traced to the fact that judgments 
about obligation are act-based whereas judgments about responsibility are agent-based. Consider the distinction 
between regulative and guidance control. If Frankfurt-type cases succeed in impugning the Principle of 
Alternate Possibilities (as I believe they do), then moral responsibility does not require regulative control; it 
merely requires guidance control. One way of accounting for this is as follows: if an agent performs some act 
freely, then it does not matter, insofar as he is to be judged from the moral point of view, whether he could in 
fact have acted otherwise; all that matters (as far as alternate possibilities go) is that he believed that he could 
have acted otherwise. But moral obligation is different; it requires regulative control. The reason is this. Just as 
'ought' (in the sense of 'obligated') implies 'can,' so too does 'wrong'; and since one is obligated to do something 
just in case it is wrong of one not to do it (that is, it is wrong to refrain from doing it), it follows that one is 
obligated to do something only if one can do it and can also refrain from doing it. 
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 As far as I can tell, there is 
no plausible corresponding argument for the claim that moral responsibility requires regulative control, 
33
 since 
in this context there is no plausible counterpart to the principle just mentioned that links obligation and 
wrongdoing. 
 
VI 
The principle that one is obligated to do something just in case it is wrong of one not to do it also plays a role in 
the question whether moral dilemmas are possible. Such dilemmas may be understood in one of two ways: 
either as situations in which an agent cannot avoid wrongdoing (I will call these obligation-dilemmas) or as 
situations in which an agent cannot avoid culpability (I will call these responsibility-dilemmas). (Writers often 
fail to distinguish between these two kinds of dilemma, due to a failure to distinguish between wrongdoing and 
culpability generally.
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) In my view, obligation-dilemmas are impossible. The arguments for this claim are 
familiar .
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 Note that, if an obligation-dilemma arose over which one had no control, one would be a victim of 
bad luck. The luck would be bad because of the wrongdoing involved. This variety of bad luck is so bad that 
some have called it 'tragic.' Thus the arguments against the possibility of obligation-dilemmas are arguments 
against the possibility that life is tragic in this sense. Note also that the question whether obligation-dilemmas 
are possible concerns luck regarding the incurring of obligations, not their fulfilment. The proponent of such 
dilemmas typically concedes that, for each obligation that an agent allegedly has, the agent has control over 
fulfilling that obligation. The opponent of such dilemmas also typically concedes this point. The question that 
such dilemmas concerns is whether it is possible to incur an obligation to perform some act A2 — an act that 
one can perform — if one already has an obligation to perform some other act Al, an act which is such that one 
can perform it, but only if one does not perform A2. The opponent of obligation-dilemmas claims that such a 
possibility cannot arise under any circumstances, and thus a fortiori cannot arise outside the control of the agent. 
 
One argument against the possibility of obligation-dilemmas conjoins the principle that one is obligated to do 
something just in case it is wrong of one not to do it with the further principle that, if one is obligated to do 
something, then it is not wrong of one to do it. These principles imply (jointly, but not singly) that it cannot 
happen that one is both obligated to do something and obligated not to do it. I believe this argument to be 
sound. Note, however, that such an argument is not available to the opponent of responsibility-dilemmas, since, 
as noted in the last section, in the context of responsibility there is no plausible counterpart to the first principle. 
 
Another argument against the possibility of obligation-dilemmas rests on the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' 
conjoined with the Principle of Agglomeration, according to which, if one ought to do each of two things, then 
one ought to do them both. I believe this argument also to be sound. But again, such an argument is unavailable 
to the opponent of responsibility-dilemmas, since in the context of responsibility there is no plausible 
counterpart to the Principle of Agglomeration. 
 
The unavailability of such arguments to the opponent of responsibility-dilemmas does not of course mean that 
such dilemmas are possible. One reason to think that they nonetheless are possible is this: even if it is 
impossible for it to be the case that all one's alternatives are in fact wrong, it is not impossible for it to be the 
case that all one's alternatives are such that one believes them to be wrong; and if responsibility turns, as I have 
claimed, on the agent's beliefs about wrongdoing rather than on actual wrongdoing, then we cannot infer the 
impossibility of responsibility-dilemmas from that of obligation-dilemmas. Despite this, it might still be true for 
some countervailing reason that one can never be faced with a situation in which one will be culpable for 
whatever it is that one does. Unfortunately, however, even if this were so, it would not mean that responsibility-
dilemmas are impossible, as I will now briefly explain. 
 
VII 
The disparity noted in Section IV between responsibility and obligation insofar as they concern direct and 
indirect control can be heightened. Return to the case of the Unsuccessful Assassin. I said that the fortuitous 
intervention of nature in the form of a passing bird, while reducing the scope of the assassin's culpability, would 
not diminish its degree. But I also noted that nature could intervene earlier in the sequence of events from a to e; 
indeed, it could intervene even prior to a, the assassin's decision to shoot. For example, it could happen that, just 
as he is about to make this decision, the assassin is seized by a sudden sneeze that prevents him from making it. 
If the fortuitous intervention of the bird does not diminish his culpability, I cannot see how the fortuitous inter-
vention of the sneeze could do so. In this case, though, there would be nothing for which he would be culpable, 
whether directly or indirectly. He would be culpable to some degree, but his culpability would have zero scope. 
He would be, as I have put it elsewhere, culpable'tout court.'
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The possibility of responsibility tout court shows that it is not only indirect responsibility that is essentially 
empty; direct responsibility is too! It shows, moreover, that responsibility is not essentially retrospective; if one 
is responsible but not responsible for anything, then one's responsibility lacks any'perspective,' whether'retro' or 
otherwise. I find no parallel to the phenomenon of responsibility tout court in the area of obligation, however; I 
can make no sense of the idea of someone's being obligated without there being anything regarding which he is 
obligated. Responsibility tout court is possible because how a person is to be judged from the moral point of 
view
37
 turns, at bottom, not on how he actually behaves but on how he counterfactually would behave. If, but 
for some stroke of luck, the unsuccessful assassin would have behaved just as the successful assassin did, then 
the former is just as culpable as the latter. Obligation tout court is not possible, because whether an act is 
obligatory turns not on what options an agent would counterfactually face but on the options he actually faces. 
If an agent has no actual options, then he has no actual obligations; if he has an actual obligation, there must be 
something regarding which he is obligated. 
 
The idea of responsibility tout court is in a way paradoxical. One arrives at it by taking seriously the idea that 
control is essential to responsibility: we cannot be responsible for what is not in our control. Yet the upshot is 
that we can be responsible even if we lack control over what we do; all that matters is (roughly) whether we 
would act in a certain way if we did have such control. In this way, we can be 'condemned' to be responsible. 
(This is once again reminiscent of what Sartre says about being 'condemned' to be free. In pointing this out, 
though, I do not mean to be taking on any excess existentialist baggage.) 
 
It might seem that, just as one can be condemned to be responsible, so too one can be condemned to be 
obligated. But there is a crucial difference. It is true that, once one has reached a certain level of maturity, it can 
happen that one cannot control whether one has certain obligations. (You might think that this is false, insofar 
as someone might avoid having any obligations at all — by committing suicide, for instance. But not so fast! 
One may have an obligation not to avoid having obligations.) Thus, whether one is obligated can be a matter of 
luck. But this has only to do with the incurring of obligation. It does not follow that whether one fulfils the 
obligations that one has can be a matter of luck. On the contrary, given that obligation requires regulative 
control (as argued in Section V), whether one fulfils one's obligations is (in this way, and to this extent) not a 
matter of luck. Thus, even if one can be condemned to be obligated, one cannot be condemned to do wrong. By 
contrast, the possibility of responsibility tout court implies that one can indeed be condemned to be culpable. I 
am afraid, therefore, that there is an important sense in which life can after all be tragic. Indeed, I would call 
this Tragedy with a capital 'T.' 
 
But not to worry! Life can also be Blessed, with a capital 'B.' That is because the possibility of responsibility 
tout court implies that one can be 'condemned' to be laudable. In fact, life can be downright Bewildering, also 
with a capital 'B.' That is because it can be both Tragic and Blessed at once. 
 
VIII 
Let me summarize the findings of this paper. 
 
I drew five distinctions concerning control. I put the first distinction (that between partial and complete control) 
aside. This was because nothing is ever in our complete control, and I assumed that neither obligation nor 
responsibility requires such control. 
 
I also put the second distinction (that between basic and comprehensive control) aside, not because this 
distinction is not relevant to questions about obligation and responsibility, but because luck is a function only of 
basic, and not also of comprehensive, control. 
 
The third distinction (that between deliberate and coincidental control) is important to both obligation and 
responsibility. In my view, both obligation and responsibility require deliberate control. More precisely, one 
cannot be either directly obligated regarding or directly responsible for something without its being the case that 
one has deliberate control over that thing. In this way, both obligation and responsibility preclude luck. 
However, it remains possible that one not have deliberate control either over fulfilling one's obligation or over 
incurring responsibility, and so luck can play a role in both areas in this way. As far as I can tell, no disparity 
between obligation and responsibility arises in connection with this third distinction. 
 
But the fourth distinction (that between direct and indirect control) is different. Here a disparity does arise. 
Insofar as direct responsibility requires direct control but direct obligation does not, luck can be a factor in the 
fulfilment of obligation in a way in which it cannot be in the incurring of responsibility. 
 
The fifth distinction (that between regulative and guidance control) also reveals a disparity between obligation 
and responsibility, inasmuch as obligation requires regulative control but responsibility apparently does not. 
 
There is, moreover, a discrepancy between obligation and responsibility with respect to the sort of bad luck 
involved in facing a moral dilemma, inasmuch as obligation-dilemmas are impossible but, unfortunately, 
responsibility-dilemmas are not. 
 
The net result of my survey, then, is as follows. With respect to the incurring of obligation: this can (but, of 
course, need not) happen entirely beyond the agent's control; however, an agent cannot be faced with 
obligation-dilemmas. With respect to the resolution of obligation: this cannot be beyond the agent's partial, 
regulative control; and insofar as it is, in particular, direct obligation that is concerned, its resolution cannot be 
beyond the agent's deliberate control. Finally, with respect to the incurring of responsibility: inasmuch as it is 
responsibility for something that is concerned, the incurring of responsibility cannot be beyond the agent's 
partial, guidance control; and insofar as it is, in particular, direct responsibility for something that is concerned, 
its incurring cannot be beyond the agent's deliberate, direct control. However, responsibility tout court may be 
incurred in a way that is wholly beyond the control of the agent. 
 
A more detailed investigation of the many and various connected issues that I have broached in this paper might 
of course result in different findings. However, even at this point it seems safe to conclude that, although there 
are several ways in which the relation between luck and obligation is similar to the relation between luck and 
responsibility, there are also several ways in which the relations are dissimilar. We would do well, therefore, not 
to confuse the two.
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